MAO TSE-TUNG CAN NEVER BE A TITO

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I. THE HAUNTING GHOST OF TITO IN THE ORIENT

The subject to be discussed in the present pamphlet is a most interesting and serious problem—the problem whether Mao Tse-tung will become a Tito in the Orient, or, whether the Chinese Communists will adopt the line of Titoism.

The problem is, of course, nothing new in any sense. Both favorable and unfavorable answers to it have been brought forth by numerous writers ever since Tito, the dictator of Yugoslavia, first turned an about-face toward Soviet Russia in 1948.

Unfortunately, the problem has so far met with no correct answer and has embarrassed a great number of people all over the world, although the march of events has gradually become self-evident and the Chinese Communist policy has proved no change ever since.

It is mostly due to the revolts which recently happened in Poland and Hungary and the recurrent controversy between Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia that Tito's role in international politics has become the subject for re-evaluation and consequently the illusion of Titoism in Communist China has come up again.

Practically, what the Chinese Communists have said

and done can speak for itself. It would be unnecessary to make further explanations. Yet the fabricated story still goes round that the Chinese Communists might support the revolts in Poland and Hungary and oppose Soviet Russia in a secret manner. Those who accept or pass the false story are largely ignorant of the statements issued by the Chinese Communists themselves, which evidently give support to the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolts by Soviet Russia, eulogize the Kadar puppet regime, and call the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy "the traitor of Hungary" and the freedom fighters of Hungarian "anti-revolutionaries."

Regarding the relationship between Moscow and Peiping, the Chinese Communists have stressed again and again that it certainly represents unity, but not breach; dependence but not isolation. The editorial of the *People's Daily* in November of 1956, under the entitle of "Long Live the Great Unity Among Socialist Countries," said: "The Chinese people firmly stand by the side of the socialist camp under the leadership of Soviet Russia. The friendship between the People's Republic of China and Soviet Russia is eternal and unshakable. This is because it is concerned with the basic interests of eight hundred millions of the two countries, and any infringement of the fundamental interests would certainly involve the infringement of other interests."

In his political report submitted to the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party, Liu Shao-chi also stressed the point that "For counteracting the subversive activities staged by imperialists against the socialist camp, the Socialist countries must stand firmly and consolidate themselves under the leadership of Soviet Rus-

sia." To that report, Mao Tse-tung gave a complete approval in the closing meeting of the Plenary Session and claimed that Communist China should come to the rescue of the Kadar regime in its fight against the Hungarian revolutionary forces and render support to Soviet Russia for its suppression and terrorism.

In the issue of December 20, 1956, the Communist *People's Daily* carried another editorial, under the title of "A Continuous Discussion of the Historic Experiences for Proletarian Dictatorship," which further elucidated the Communist political stand as well as its policy line for the present stage. This passage which appeared in the official organ may be, of course, construed as representing the opinion of the Chinese Communist authorities. The gist of the editorial may be summarized as follows:

(1) In the opinion of the Chinese Communists, the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt is due to the fact that the Hungarian Communists have failed to establish a proletarian dictatorship, and "Socialist democracy can never run counter, in any sense, to the proletarian dictatorship." (2) The Chinese Communists frankly recognize that what they need is internationalism but not nationalism. "The Communist party in any country must educate their party members and the civilians with the spirit of internationalism. And for the purpose of strengthening the unity of international proletarians and for the benefit of proletarian dictatorship, they will have to overcome their inclination for nationalism." (3) In the opinion of the Chinese Communists, Stalin made more contributions to international Communism than the number of his faults. (4) Tito and Titoism

must be denounced with no reserve, for Tito's behaviour is to the detriment of the Communist consolidation. (5) In summary, "all the Communist countries should make every effort to strengthen their unity under the leadership of Soviet Russia, and to struggle for the final victory for proletarian dictatorship."

The issuance of the editorial in Peiping drew much attention throughout the Communist world, especially when the Second Plenary Session of the Communist Party was just brought to a close and Chou En-lai was about to go on a tour of Moscow. It may be easily understood that the Chinese Communists want still to stand by the side of Russia and to show their allegiance to Moscow even when it was confronted with a state of confusion and the Iron Curtain almost began to totter to its fall.

The Chinese Communist stand as shown in the editorial is one of the important results produced by the series of meetings of the Plenary Session concerning the world situation, which might lead them to believe that they had to make a final decision under the troubled conditions of the Communist camp. But comparing with the conditions of Hungary, Mao would neither take the line of Nagy, nor that of Kadar. What he would follow is actually the old course taken by many Stalinists. That is to say, he would advocate the strengthening of "proletarian dictatorship" to continue his rule with highhandedness, and make his regime more dependent on Soviet Russia. That Mao Tse-tung dares to continue to extol Stalin over and over again may just reflect the revival of Stalinism in Russia.

Knowing the real attitude of Mao, some dreamers of "Chinese Titoism" are obliged once again to acknowledge their own faults, and say that "The Chinese Communists have clearly expressed their determination not to leave the Soviet orbit."

However, we have to ask: Has the dream of a Chinese Tito completely vanished? Will it not reappear in the future? Nobody can say yes, especially at the moment when differences of opinion are still prevailing. It is for this reason that a careful and thorough study of the question has become most necessary for students of international affairs.

As the situation in Communist China is different to a great extent from that of Western countries overrun by Soviet Russia, Mao and his righthand men can be understood better by the Chinese themselves than by the Western people. Over the Communist problem, the Chinese have again and again made known their opinions and warnings before the free world but have been ignored time and again. But the march of events has proved that they are right.

Evidently, so long as the dream of "Chinese Titoism" has not disappeared from the free world, the anti-Communist strategy of the democracies, especially as it is applied to the Far East, will not be entirely free from the influence of wishful thinking. Then, the gravest danger confronting the democracies will be that the leaders of the democratic nations are plunged themselves, willy-nilly, into a state of day-dreaming, thus leavnig the strength of the free world paralyzed or disarmed ideologically.

When the confused idea about Titoism is prevailing throughout the free world which is engaged in a uphill struggle against Communism, the compilation and distribution of a pamphlet based on a comprehensive study will be always indispensable for the benefit of either the free Chinese abroad or the free world at large.

The present brochure on Titoism does not attempt to persuade the readers with any subjective view. It is a mere presentation of facts—historic as well as current—accompanied with logical reasoning and judgement. It is believed that only in this way can it shed some light on the matter and arrive at a sound conclusion for the much mooted problem.

II. HOW WAS THE ILLUSION OF A CHINESE TITOIST ORIGINATED?

It goes without saying that many people in the world still have the question in mind: "Maybe the dictator of Communist China is just as anxious to get rid of the yoke of Moscow as Tito has demonstrated." Tito has become changeable for the sake of his own interests. Why not Mao Tse-tung?

It is no wonder that one puts the question because he knows nothing about Communist China. But much to our regret, a number of self-styled "old China hands" also bring up the same foolish question and even carelessly answered "yes." Of course, they have reason to argue: "You know Tito was a staunch follower of Stalin. Who can guarantee that Mao would never change?"

This specious reasoning is largely based on a psychological factor. For a man is generally more influenced by his wishful thinking rather than by his keen insight. Psychologically, he used to think or to act, for one reason or the other, according to his own wishes. Especially in a confused state of mind or in a controversy, he would try to find the possibility which might prove false afterwards.

Supposing one offers an alternative for the question: "If it is possible for Mao Tse-tung to become a Tito, why

does he wait for so long?" The answer would be quite another thing. Thinking along this line, one would find that the question put by the wishful-thinkers is far from realities. To say that Mao would possibly follow Titoism is nothing but fantasy.

Yet, in some cases, the imagination is not entirely groundless. It is encouraged by the constant changes of the world situation, such as the troubles in Russia since the death of Stalin, the weakening of the Communist empire by satellitic riots, the shooting war going on in Mid-East, and the attitude of Yugoslavia which greatly reduced the prestige of Russia. Any one of new change may add a factor to the illusion of Chinese Titoism.

Based on the same assumption, one can also find a great deal of semblance between Mao and Tito. For example, the policy line of the Chinese Communists does not completely deviate from nationalism. Nor can Mao Tse-tung completely discard his inclination toward heroism. It is nationalism and heroism that make Tito or Gomulka to take the way of what is called "national Communism." Communist China is far more powerful than either Poland or Yugoslavia. She would have every chance to get away from the Soviet orbit.

Logically, if the major premise is true in all cases, the conclusion would undoubtedly lead to a favorable answer to the problem. But as a matter of fact, the premise has been proved completely wrong.

The Chinese Communists never believe in nationalism.

In strategy, it is only used, if necessary, as a camouflage for promoting a class war. It is used as a deception for propaganda. And Mao himself, well aware of the military ties between Moscow and Peiping, would be the last one to run risk of being a defectionist of the Communist empire. He would not be so foolish as to spoil his own political life built throught thousands of bad days.

As for other factors which nourish the misleading idea of a Chinese Tito, the following facts are usually considered to be most important:

First, the shadow of the traditional pacifist and appeasement policy of the Western countries has not disappeared as yet. It is more so in the United Kingdom than in the United States. The world would never forget that the British were among the first to recognize Red China. They did so not because they thought that they would cordially coexist with Communism, but because they imagined that Mao would turn out to be a Tito at anytime in the Orient. In that case, they think, they would recover all the markets in Mainland China that they had lost. So recognition of Red China, by following the old policy of appeasement toward Hitler, would be more profitable and realistic than the adoption of an opposite policy.

For some years, there has been the same tendency in the United States. When Truman was in office, there was a debate in the Congress over the question whether the United States should be involved in the Chinese civil war. Some of the senators or representatives also insisted on the recognition of Red China. They favored following the suit

of the British even when a hot war was going on in Korea between the Communist countries and the democratic camp.

Under the policy of appeasement and what is called containment, the idea of "Two Chinas" was just as provocative as that of "Two Koreas" or "Two Germanys". To offer a solution for "easing the world tension", the British proposed recently to lift the embargo against Red China, and the US Government urged the Chinese Communists to stop using force in the Taiwan Straits. The Communists, on the other hand, timely launched a "peace offensive" and even fabricated a lot of stories regarding the so-called "peace talks" between Mao's regime and the Republic of China in Formosa, with an insidious attempt to create the impression that Mao would some day turn out to be a real Tito in the Orient.

Any one who recognizes the undercurrent going on in the United States would be astonished to see what an effect has been produced by the idea of "Chinese Titoism."

Another grave mistake that the democracies have made for their policies toward Red China consists in strategical consideration.

In the eyes of the political leaders of the democratic countries, the loss of the China mainland to the Communists would suggest that a vast number of manpower and materials go to the enemy of the democratic camp. In a comparison of the two sides, the democratic camp is obviously in an unfavorable position strategically. If it is necessary to keep the balance of power for a longer time, the

shortest way would be the winning of Mao to this side, and by so doing there would not be another war which might lead to the extinction of the whole world.

Doubtlessly, there is sometimes a strong voice in the United States over the Communist problem. Some are even of the opinion that recognition of Red China does not necessarily mean approval of a Communist regime, it is but a realistic step that the United States could adopt for the time being. There are also others who think that admission of Red China to the U.N. would help keep cordial relationship between the Americans and the Chinese people on the mainland. These views are, unquestionably, shaped by the idea of Titoism.

Secondly, the wrong impression that Mao may be a Tito in Communist China is mostly a creation of the Communist fellow-travellers, dupes and spies working underground in the democratic countries.

For instance, Lattimore, Fairbank and others have endeavored, by taking advantage of every chance, to claim that the Chinese Communists are "National Communists" and their party is an independent political party. Neither will they tolerate the control of Soviet Russia for too long, nor will they remain in the Communist camp for ever. These absurd remarks, obviously, give inmeasurable encouragement to the delusion of a Chinese Tito. But as a result of investigations made in the United States, most of the propaganda arguments prove to be a well-designed trap set by the Communist fellow-travellers, dupes and spies.

However, all those misleading remarks or conceptions should have been clarified if the march of events and realities could be carefully gripped by the general public. As early as in 1949, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress submitted a report, under the title of "Communism in China," in which the first paragraph of the Preface says:

"The Communist Party in China is the formal Communist party. Its dogmas perfectly follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leader is also Moscow-trained. Its policy and actions, strategy and tactics, all belong to Communism. The Chinese Communists have faithfully followed the Kremlin line at every turn for the last generation.

"The character and significance of the Chinese Communist Party have aroused more controversies in the United States than the Communist party of any other country of the world. These controversies have been fermented among the scholars and commentators, and have been reflected on the public opinion and the policies adopted by the U.S. government. But for the present, evidences are conspicuous enough though it was so before, hence there is no need for the continuance of the controversies."

In fact, many evidences of its kind are self-evident. The controversy over the Chinese Communist problem is absolutely worthless. Even Secretary of State Dulles stressed the point recently that there was definitely no possibility for Mao Tse-tung's conversion into a Tito. But why has there existed the conjecture about Mao? What are the other factors, besides those above-mentioned, that may foster the wrong conception? Among other things, the march of world

events in the last few months as well as the decline of Russia's prestige in the Communist camp have much to do with the wrong idea, the rebellions in the satellite countries have directly encouraged many people to think that Mao Tse-tung may also become a Tito someday. But as a matter of fact, those people are not free from the influence of wishful thinking, and so, a more detailed analysis will be made in the following sections.

To sum up the misleading impression regarding Mao's turning out to be a Tito is mostly fostered by wishful thinking. It is dangerous enough for any inference. Let us not forget Mr. Dulles' famous words:

"To recognize your enemy, that is always our motto."

III. WHAT IS TITOISM?

When one attempts a solution to the question whether there will be a Tito in Communist China, he will have to make a thorough examination into the implications of the term "Titoism".

The term "Titoism" was created following the incident in 1948 when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Because Marshal Tito was the head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, its rebellion from the Cominform would naturally suggest a breach between Tito himself and Stalin. Since then, Tito, in the eyes of the Western observers, has set an example for any possible desertion or freedom of action of the satellite countries from the control of Soviet Russia, and consequently any case or tendency of the same nature is generally termed Titoism.

The first one in which the term "Titoism" is used is the official organ of the Communist Party of Poland. The paper said: "Titoism is a sort of principle characterized by the mania of leadership, the feeling of self-conceit, the lack of far-sightedness and reconciliation, and exaggerated planning." In February 1950, Liu Shao-chi of the Chinese Communist Party also made a severe criticism against Titoism by saying that "the national consciousness as

implied in Titoism indicates a revival of the reactionary consciousness which is backward and feudalistic in nature". These are the remarks from the Communists, and of course much prejudiced.

Some native politicians in the West regard Tito's rebellion against Soviet Russia as the beginning of the collapse of the Communist empire. They play with Tito as a ped, and immense aid, economic as well as military, and sympathy go to him, Titoism is used as an effective weapon to fight against the Soviets in the cold war. Posing as one of the most important figures in the news, Tito, treacherous enough, has not failed to seize the chance by making extortions and blackmail from the Western countries, and has gained so much that he had hardly expected. Neither could Stalin do anything about him, nor his successors. Khrushchev and Bulganin even had to pay a state visit, for the first time in the history of Russia, to Yugoslavia, and to shake hands again with Tito as a gesture of a demand for renewal of the normal relations between the two countries.

What is the background that made Tito an outstanding figure on the international stage? This will need some explanation.

Since Tito became a deserter from the Cominform, some political Commentators of the West came to the conclusion that Tito definitely defies "internationalism", while others maintained that he is in favor of "national Communism". There has been quite a difference of opinion about the supposition, and no one knows who is right.

In fact, the Russians never used the term "internationalism" as is understood by the general observers. They rather use it as a mask, for the purpose of propaganda. Laying emphasis on practice instead of theory, the Russian Communists used to take the international organization, such as the Cominform or the like, as a means of control over the Communist parties of different countries, which have to show their allegiance to and accept directives from it. In such case, the Communist parties of the countries that have become members of the international organization will have to take the Soviet Union as their fatherland and to put the interests of the latter above their own. In case the interests of Soviet Union are in conflict with those of the satellite countries, the Communist parties of those countries will have to champion Soviet Russia at the expense of their own. To the Russian Communists, this is just a normal condition throughout the Communist empire.

But to Tito, that is not the case which could be accepted by Yugoslavia. He would try to keep balance between the interests of Soviet Union and those of his country. If it is impossible for both to go together, he would not hesitate to make a choice nor would he tolerate the superiority of the Soviet Union. That explains why Tito was obliged at last to desert from the strictly organized Cominform.

In such a case, Stalin, of course, would not wait and see and would not let other satellite countries follow the example set by Tito. So Stalin launched a severe attack against Tito with all the strength of the Cominform and even was prepared to crush the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with armed force. Attempting to keep his position

intact, Tito turned to the democratic countries of the West, and launched a counterattack against Stalin with Americans, the British and the French standing behind him. He immediately accepted large quantities of material assistance from the West on the one hand, and arrived at an agreement with the West on the other, that there would be no change in the political system in Yugoslavia and no intervention from the West. While Stalin attempted an economic blockade against Yugoslavia, Tito walked out of the Communist camp and established relations with the West economically.

But there was quite a different phase in diplomacy. Tito did not firmly stand on the side of the democracies. Ostensibly, he adopted the line of neutralism, but in fact, he had the same voice with the Soviets in international arena. In any fight over a question in the United Natoins Assembly, the delegates of Yugoslavia used to vote in support of the stand of Soviet Russia. Although Tito's delegates to the UN sometimes abstained from voting in the manner of fence-sitters, there were very few of such cases. In the voting record of the UN, no one can find a single case that the delegates of Yugoslavia cast a vote for any proposal of the Western nations when the Russian delegates stood in opposition.

Hence, it can be seen clearly that Tito has had no sincerity to receive military and economic aid from the Western nations, and his neutralism has been nothing but a mask. His real attitude, or Titoism as it may be called, is tinged with vacillation and mostly hings on the change of the Russo-Yugoslavia relationship.

Tito is a perfidious and treacherous man. He knows well that Russia's new attitude toward Yugoslavia is due to his freedom from the Soviet control. He knows too that because of the same reason he has been highly regarded by the Western nations. Should he return to the Communist camp, his high prestige among the family of nations would be reduced to nothing. Thus, he adopts a policy line of what is called central-leftist. While he approaches more closely to Soviet Russia, he would claim at the same time that his action bears no effect upon his friendship with the Western nations. In the meantime, his approach to Soviet Russia is not unconditional. Khrushchev and Bulganin had to recognize that Yugoslavia should enjoy an "equal status" with Soviet Union, and that the "independence" of Yugoslavia should be esteemed. Besides, they had also to accept Tito's proposal that all Titoists put in prison in the satellite countries by Stalin be released, and that the Soviet control over those countries be loosened so that they could attain an independent status under cooperation instead of control. That is to say, the satellite countries of Soviet Union should be allowed to take the line of "Semi-Titoists". To Tito, this is very logical, because different states may march to socialism through different ways.

On the contrary, it was quite a different phase in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe where the Communist regimes were all created by Soviet Russia when she was in military occupation of those areas. The Communist bosses of those countries were all appointed by Moscow, and were not supported by the masses of their own countries. In the meantime, they had no sufficient armed strength, they had to rely on the Russian armed forces for defending their

new regimes. As soon as the Germans were defeated and the Eastern European peoples were freed from Nazism, the Communist parties immediately took the place of the old regimes and surrendered their nations to another foreign ruler—Soviet Russia, despite the aspirations of those peoples for independence. It was because of this reason that the masses of those countries showed no sympathy at all toward the Communist parties from the very beginning of their seizure of power.

Under such circumstances, it is only natural that the peoples of Eastern Europe have cherished a very deep antipathy toward both the Communist parties and Soviet Russia. They have been fully aware that they have to struggle for the independence of the nation even at the price of lives and everything else.

The Russian display of Titoism in Poland merely proves a treachery from Moscow and a false independence planned by Khrushchev. The Polish people were greatly disappointed with Gomulka, and even Marshal Rokosovsky, the Governor-General appointed by Moscow, was expelled by the Polish Communist Party. In Hungary, it was almost a repetition of the same case. Titoism was totally denounced by the popular revolution. Russia's attempt to placate the satellites by Titoism only precipitated the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution which led to the use of guns and tanks by Soviet troops as the last resort to put down the revolts and destroy Nagy's regime.

The reason why Khrushchev and Bulganin made so much compromise with Tito is not necessarily that they

wanted to please him. It is primarily due to the fact that the satellite countries have become increasingly disgusted with the Soviet control since the death of Stalin, particularly that the popular revolts in East Berlin, Czekoslovakia and Poland have driven the Soviet bosses at bay. To Khrushchev, Soviet Russia had no other way out but continuing its control over the satellite countries, and when doing so she would have to keep the Communist regime going on in those countries by easing the antipathy of the people of those countries. For the freedom fighters of those countries have endeavored to rid themselves from the control of the Communist party of their own countries and of Soviet Russia.

According to Khrushchev's judgement, the satellites would have been satisfied if Tito's proposal was accepted and they were allowed to take the form of "independence". Only in that case, Soviet Russia would have time to have the conditions improved by the puppet regimes and to have the popular uprisings extinguished once for all.

But beyond his expectation, the fact proved otherwise. His policy toward the satellites has not only been pursued to no avail, but has led to an appalling upheaval in Hungary that inflicted a fatal blow on the Communist empire.

On account of the difference of conditions between the satellite countries in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, Titoism could not be accepted in those countries. For Tito developed his strength mostly during the Second World War when he fought against the Nazis under the banner of Nationalists. In that fight, he gained enormous assistance from the British and the Americans, but not the Russians. Consequently, the Soviet control over Yugoslavia became less and Tito's struggle for freedom from the control became stronger. Finally, he ventured an audacious rebellion against Stalin.

The above analysis, much detailed as it seems to be, is attempted to give a clear picture of what Titoism is, and to provide a clue to the question whether Titoism could be adopted by Communist China.

Some Westerners consider it possible for Mao Tse-tung to become a Chinese Tito, and have tried hard to make it come true. But as a matter of fact, Mao has stood as he was and has proved to be more faithful to Soviet Russia. That Mao has not changed his mind at all is primarily due to the fact that he owes his existence and power on the mainland to the Russian support. As long as the Soviet "Elder Brothers" stand behind the Chinese Communist Party and have a hand in his military as well as economic affairs, Mao dares not change. On the other hand, the Chinese people on the mainland are disgusted with Communism, and Free China has made mature preparations for a counterattack. Under such a condition, Mao is not likely to change his attitude toward Soviet Russia. Otherwise, his regime would collapse under an attack from both within and without.

Thanks to the support and honor given by Moscow, Communist China has undoubtedly played an important role in the Communist bloc. Keeping this in his mind, Mao would never be willing to change. Although Mao has sometimes shouted the slogan of "patriotism" or "let patriotism and internationalism be dovetailed!" that slogan will remain

to be a reception to cheat the Chinese people and the free world. In the following passages some facts may serve as concrete evidence in proof of this point.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE "LEANING ON ONE SIDE" POLICY

Before arriving at a correct conclusion as to the question whether Mao Tse-tung will become a Tito, it seems to be necessary to make a careful study of the relationship between Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, the historic background of the Communist International, the history of the last thirty years during which the Soviet representative Vitinsky, sent to China as early as 1920, was responsible for the establishment and development of the Chinese Communist Party, and the ups and downs of the 28 "typical Chinese Bolshevists" trained at Moscow. However, it would require a large space to make an extensive explanation here, and some of the special studies on one or the other subject have already been made known to the general public. So this chapter will be limited to the explanation of the relationship between Moscow and Peiping in the last few years and particularly the so-called "Leaning on One Side" policy pursued by the Chinese Communists.

Since the establishment of the puppet regime in China in 1949, the relationship between Moscow and Peiping has gradually developed from ideological coordination to every other aspect, political, military, economic, cultural, educational, and social. The following treaties that have been concluded between Moscow and Peiping will sufficiently explain how far they have come together:

TREATIES	DATE OF CONCLUSION	PLACE
"Sino-Russian Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty"	February 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Loan Granted By Soviet Russia to the People's Republic of China"	February 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding Establishment of the Connection System for Telegraph and Telephone Service Between Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China"	February 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Establishment of the Sino-Russian Oil Corporation in Sinkiang"	March 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Establishment of a Colored and Rare Metals Corporation in Sinkiang"	March 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Establishment of the Sino-Russian Civil Air Lines"	March 1955	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Working Conditions of the Soviet Russian Experts sent to the People's Republic of China"	March 1955	Moscow

"Sino-Russian Trade agreement for 1950"	April 1950	Moscow
"Protocol Regarding the Supply of Industrial Equipment and Materials from Russia to China Between 1950 and 1952"	April 1950	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Joint Transportation by Railways Between Soviet Russia and China"	March 1951	Peiping
"Sino-Russian Trade Agreement for 1951"	June 1951	Moscow
"Protocol Regarding the Supply of Equipment and Materials to China from Russia in 1951"	June 1951	Moscow
"Sino-Russian Trade Agreement for 1952"	April 1952	Moscow
"Protocol Regarding the Supply of Equipment and Materials to China from Russia in 1952"	April 1952	Moscow
"Exchange Note Regarding the Prolongation of the Tenure for the Common Use of Port Arthur as Naval Base by Soviet Russia and China"	September, 1952	Moscow

"Protocol Regarding the Flow of Manufactured Goods Between Soviet Russia and China for 1953"	March 1953	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Development of the Existing Power Stations and the Construction of New Power Stations in China With the Aid of Soviet Russia"	March 1953	Moscow
"Protocol Regarding the Exchange of Goods Between Soviet Russia and China for 1954"	January 1954	Moscow
"Contract Regarding the Distribution of Soviet Films in China"	May 1954	Peiping
"Agreement Regarding the Development of Broadcasting Service Between Russia and China"	August 1954	Moscow
"Joint Declaration Issued by the Government of USSR and the Government of the People's Republic of China"	October 1954	Peiping
"Agreement Regarding the Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between Soviet Russia and China"	October 1954	Peiping

"The Joint Report Regarding the Construction of the Lanchow-Urmuchi-Alma-Ata Railway Line and the Joint Transportation thereof"	October 1954	Peiping
"The Joint Report Regarding the Construction of the Railway Line Leading from Chiling to Ulan Bater by China, Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia"	October 1954	Peiping
"Protocol Regarding the Exchange of Goods Between Soviet Russia and China for 1955"	February 1955	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Use of Atomic Energy By China With the Aid of Soviet Russia"	April 1955	Moscow
"The Ultimate Protocol Regarding the Withdrawal of Soviet Russian Armed Forces From Port Arthur and Transfer of the Equipment in That Region to China"	April 1955	Port Arthur
"Protocol Regarding the Promotion of Scientific and Technical Aid in the Government Departments Between Soviet Russia and China"	June 1955	Peiping

"Agreement Regarding the Quarantine for Agricultural Products"	August 1955	Peiping
"Protocol Regarding the Exchange of Goods Between Soviet Russia and China for 1956"	December 1956	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Joint Establishment of A Nuclear Research Institute"	March 1956	Moscow
"Agreement Regarding the Development of Economic Cooperation Between China and Russia"	April 1956	Peiping
"Agreement Regarding the Joint Survey and Utilization of the Natural Resources Along the Amur River by Soviet Russia and China"	August 1956	Moscow

It is clearly to be seen from the above treaties that in Communist China, the political and economic affairs, natural resources, communications, education as well as cultural activities are all put under the control of Soviet Russia.

To begin with industry, all the equipment required for industries in Communist China have come from Russia and are managed by Russian experts. So far as the first Five-Year Plan is concerned, for the 156 kinds of enterprises, such as steel and iron works, colored metal works, coal mines, oil refineries, machine factories, motor works, power

stations, etc., the Russian advisers or experts enjoy the right to select the sites of factories or works, to collect materials and make decisions in planning, to supply with equipment, and to give directions for construction, installation, and manufacturing. The Chinese Communists had to pay the other contracting party in kind, which include rice, soy bean, raw silk, tea, pork, tobacco, oranges and dried eggs.

Since the conclusion of the "Agreement Regarding Scientific Cooperation" in October, 1954, Soviet Russia has supplied the Chinese Communists with 600 blueprints for factories, work shops, transporting and cultural units and 1,700 blueprints for machinery, equipment and installation, including derricks, lifts, excavators, air compressors and the like.

In October of 1956 when Mikoyan visited Peiping, he on behalf of the Soviet Union, concluded with the Peiping regime an "Agreement Regarding the Development of Economic Cooperation." It was prescribed in the Agreement that Soviet Russia should render assistance to Communist China to set up 55 factories, which make a total of 211 factories together with those already completed. These 55 new enterprises include metallurgical works, chemical works, artificial dyestuff factories, electronics, and radio industries, and research institutes for aeronautical engineering. Soviet Russia, as prescribed, should supply Communist China with all the equipment, blueprints as well as technical aid, of which the worth amounts to 2,500 million rubles. On the other hand, Communist China should pay in agricultural products.

In the same Agreement, there are also some provisions regarding the construction of the railway line leading from Lanchow through Turkistan to Atuka in Siberia and joint transportation. All these stipulations further prove that the Chinese Communist regime is virtually incompetent to carry out its industrial plan without aid from Roviet Russia and that its economic strength is simply not strong enough to remain outside of the Soviet orbit.

Inasmuch as all the new enterprises are in the hands of Soviet Russia, the Russian advisors have accordingly the chance to work in every department of the Chinese puppet administration and the chance to scatter all over the Communist China.

According to the report of the *People's Daily,* November 7,1956, there is a permanent USSR Cultural and Educational Mission stationed in the State Council and the offices for the Russian Chief Advisor and Deputy Chief Advisors for Economic Affairs. Under the State Council, there are also a number of chief Advisor and Advisors from Russia, working in every department, such as the Department of Finance, Department of Food Stuffs, Department of Commerce, Department of Foreign Trade, Department of Heavy Industry, Department of Light Industry, Department of National Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Forestry, Department of Geology, Department of Architecture, Textile Department, Railway Department, Department of Justice, Department of Education, Department of Communication, and others. In factories, workshops, corporations, or schools, the planning and technical

administration are also in the hands of the Russian advisors or experts.

Ostensibly, the Chung-Chang Railway, the Civil Air Lines and the Sinkiang Oil Company have been transferred to the Chinese Communist regime, but many of the important posts in those organizations are still occupied by Russians. For instance, the chief of Urumchi Line Department of the Civil Air Lines is a Russian by the name of Kudniev, the deputy chief of the same Department is a Russian by the name of Rognov, and the manager for geological investigation of the Sinkiang Oil Co. is a Russian named Pagnion (See the *Sinkiang Jih Pao,* January 1, 1956).

On November 4, 1956, another batch of Russian advisors arrived at Peiping from Moscow, among whom were many experts on radio service and water conservancy. It is through the extensive activities of those advisors and experts scattered all over the country that the Chinese Communist regime has been brought under the control of Soviet Russia and is in no possition to offer any resistance.

In thought control over the Chinese Communist regime, Soviet Russia has exported a huge quantity of publications into mainland China. Since the establishment of the Chinese puppet regime, the Chinese translated version from Russian books have constituted the greater portion of Chinese Communist publications. From October 1949, to December 1950, the number of translated book stood at 64.1 percent of the total publication in Communist China, and it increased to 79.2 in 1951, 79.3 percent in 1952, 87.7 percent in 1953, and 90 percent in 1954. Up to the end

of 1955, translated books amounted to more than 7,000 kinds.

Since 1955, the People's Publishing Service and the San-Lien Book Company have reprinted more than 400 kinds of Russian works on philosophy and social science, in which are included all the works of Lienin and Stalin.

In schools and colleges run by the Chinese Communists, many Russian textbooks are adopted. For example, in the North Eastern People's University, 43 courses are introduced and 118, kinds of textbooks are adopted from Soviet Russia.

Since 1954, the Higher Education Department of Communist China has made a great effort in translating Russian textbooks used for colleges and universities. Those which have already come off the press, covering finance, economics, politics, science, jurisprudence, amount to 107 kinds. The other translated works covering mathematics, physics, civil engineering, agriculture and forestry, geology and metallurgy, amount to more than one hundred kinds. In middle schools and primary schools, some of the textbooks are also introduced from Soviet Russia. For example, all the beginners of schools have to read the translated books "Lenin's Mantle" and "Our Volka"—the textbooks which are popularly used in Russia. All these examples point to the fact that Chinese Communists have left no stone unturned in promoting Russianization in mainland China.

Besides, the Soviet motion picture has a very large market in Communist China. According to the report of the

Communist magazine *The Mass Film* in its tenth issue, 1955, Communist China performed altogether 1,133,719 showings of motion pictures in 1954, of which the Soviet-produced film constituted more than 30 percent. And according to Chien Chin-jui's official report appearing in the *People's Daily,* Nov. 7, 1956 the Soviet film enjoyed approximately two million showings in Communist China up to the end of 1955, and the audience reached as many as 1,160 million odd. When Soviet Russia celebrated its 39th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Peiping regime sponsored a large-scale "Soviet Film Week" for the celebration in all the major cities of Red China.

To strengthen the tie between Soviet Russia and Communist China, the Chinese Reds have made strenuous efforts in propaganda activities. As was disclosed by the Communist *Kwang Ming Jih Pao,* Nov. 8, 1956, the "Sino-Soviet Friendship Association" and its chapters turned out last year some three or four hundred kinds of pamphlets regarding Soviet Russia, and several scores of graphic charts. The chapters of the Association in Shanghai, Wuchang and Hankow, Changchun, Kwangchow, and Tsingtao hold meetings almost every two days. The chapter of the Association in Yunnan Province even sent last year some vehicles for propaganda work to the regions of the aboriginal tribes, such as Pu-erh, Kunma, and Likiang. And *the Sino-Soviet Friendship Bulletin* published by the Yunnan chapter has been changed, since the beginning of last year, from a weekly into a semi-weekly.

Parallel to the efforts for Russianization, the Chinese Communists have built, in a period of two years, many

magnificent buildings as sites for Soviet exhibition. For instance, the "Soviet Exhibition Mansion" located at Peiping covers an area of 140,000 square kilometers, another building in Shanghai, West Nanking Rd., covers an area of 95,000 square kilometers, and the Sino-Russian Friendship Building in Kwangchow covers an area of 33,7000 square kilometers. All these buildings are planned after the pattern of Russian architecture. In October 1954, March and October of 1955, they held on a large scale the Soviet exhibitions in those mansions respectively, and showed little concern for the people's living conditions for the sake of Russia.

All the examples and the statistical figures as stated above may prove to what extent the "Leaning on One Side Policy" has been carried out by the Chinese Communist regime. As they have already done too much for Russianization in mainland China, one has to recognize that they have always stood where they were and that there is substantially little possibility of any sudden change in their attitude toward Soviet Russia.

V. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEIPING

A general analysis has been made of the control which Soviet Russia exercises over the puppet Peiping regime in the previous chapter. Its control in the economic and military fields is by far the most important. This fact is a sufficient indication that the puppet regime would never turn into a Titoist. To prove it, a closer scrutiny is called for.

Whether a Communist regime can turn into a Titoist depends in the last analysis on whether it can extricate itself from the economic relations with the Soviet imperialists.

The economic system and policy of the Soviet satellites are not drawn up on the basis of their own interests, but those of Soviet Russia. This system is an objective condition which may account for the reason why Soviet Russia can exercise effective and strict control over the economy of its satellites.

The puppet regime in Peiping occupies a usually important position among the Soviet satellites, because economically it has more to offer than all others. It cannot be denied that the degree of industrialization on the mainland lags behind that of the countries in Eastern Europe. While there is mutual dependence among the latter for the supply of industrial raw materials, their dependence on

Soviet Russia is not absolutely indispensable. On the other hand, judged from the condition of the puppet Peiping regime, such a dependence is adsolutely necessary. This is a very important fundamental factor.

The economic dependence of the puppet Peiping regime on its Soviet master is twofold. First, purely from its own economic interest, Soviet Russia has to tighten its control over the economy of Chinese stooge. Secondly, from the political point of view, the puppet Peiping regime is an instrument of Soviet expansionism. The aid given to the Chinese Communists by the Soviets both in arms industry and the development of strategic communications is primarily to realize a more ambitious aggressive design of the Communist bloc of nations by bringing the natural resources and economic potential of the Chinese mainland into the military supply system with Soviet Russia as the center. Under such a relationship, political as well as economic, for the period of peace as well as for the period of war, the Chinese Communists have no other choice but to lean on their Soviet master. They have, to all intents and purposes, lost all their economic independence.

The Soviets exercise their economic control over their satellites through three basic forms. First, they exercise direct contorl over the equipment of the industrial enterprises and products through economic aid. Secondly, they absorb the exports and take their surplus products through trade relations. Thirdly, they tighten their control of their satellites' economy by an over-all long-term "development plan."

The Russian aid to the puppet regime has constituted

the central core of the first and second "Five-Year Plans" of the puppet regime. All the aid to the enterprises is to be returned mainly in the form of exported commodities and other products by installments. All industrial enterprises on the mainland, either big or small, being the recipients of Russian aid and under the control of Russian advisors and experts, the Kremlin practically exercises an effective control over all industries there, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

The second form of economic control over the puppet regime by the Soviet imperialists is to increase its dependence upon them by means of trade. The mainland trade with the Soviet bloc of nations in 1954, according to Communist reports, constituted 80 percent of its total volume of trade but increased to the neighborhood of 85 percent in 1955. The tendency is still on the increase.

In terms of merchandise and price, the puppet regime made the following revelations: For the importation of the Russian-aided industrial equipment, it had to reduce large quantities of the consumption of foodstuffs and oil of the people for exportation. While there is a serious shortage of food and oil, Chinese soya beans are being supplied to the Russians at reduced prices both for their consumption and export purposes after having been processed.

The trade relations between the puppet regime and Soviet Russia, in the name of international division of labor, is far from equitable, as reflected chiefly in the increased dependence of the mainland industries. For example, the two five-year plans of the puppet regime, in the distributions,

stressed the development of inland industries and shift of heavy industries, as far as possible, to the heartland so as to connect with the heartland of Soviet Russia. All industrial enterprises in the heartland of the mainland depend solely on the Soviet imperialist either for their raw materials, technique and transportation of the manufactured products. With respect to heavy industries, the puppet regime lays special emphasis on the development of ferrous industries, though all other non-ferrous industries are still in their infancy. So far as ferrous industries are concerned, manganese, nickel, chromium, molybdenum, and vanadium required for the production of high-grade still are all supplied by Soviet Russia. Investments for the production of these minerals are quite insignificant.

On the basis of "international division of labor" Soviet Russia compels the puppet regime to fall back on it in the supply of certain raw materials, thereby depriving its Chinese stooge of any propspect to set up its own independent industrial system. With the mainland economy in their firm grip, the Soviets naturally can reduce the mainland industries to a state of complete paralysis when and if necessary.

The third form of economic control over the puppet regime by the Soviets is exactly the same as it has been doing to their satellites in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, they have drawn up a plan "to utilize the power resources of the Danube River and to organize all People's democratic countries into a power community." Similarly, in September, 1956, they decided to cooperate with the puppet Peiping regime in exploiting the resources along the Heilungkiang.

To carry out this plan includes geological, water conservancy and land soil survey, utilization of water power and agricultural resources and also distribution and setup of industrial enterprises. In space, it consists of the main and branch rivers of the Heilungkiang Sunghua River and a part of the Liao River as well as their tributaries in the nearby Soviet territory, covering more than 600,000 square kilometers. A large group of Russian experts have already been sent to the Chinese mainland. Soon after its return of the Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen and "Soviet-Chinese Joint-operated enterprises," Soviet Russia, in the name of exploitation, has practically placed all the northeastern provinces under its direct control.

The economic dependence of the puppet regime upon Soviet Russia being such, it would be preposterous to assume that it will break its relations completely with its Soviet master and strive for its own independence. Our conclusion is that their economic relation will be getting closer with every passing day. In fact, there is little sign to show any loosening of these relations. Thus from the economic viewpoint, to expect the puppet regime to turn into Titoists will forever remain an illusion.

VI. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEIPING

Another form of effective control over its satellites by Soviet Russia is military alliance. The puppet Peiping regime is today placed under the control of such a military alliance.

Military alliances among the Communist nations can be well regarded as a result of the ever unfolding cold war between two opposite world camps. The alliance between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia is a counter measure in response to the signing of the U.S.-Japanese Peace Treaty. The Warsaw Pact was signed to counter the North Atlantic Treaty and the rearmament of West Germany. And the treaty of "friendship and cooperation" between East Germany and the puppet Peiping regime was signed in consequence of the encirclement of the Communist bloc by the free world. However, the main objective of such military alliances is to set up a strong aggressive organization with Soviet Russia in the center protected by all its satellites, Once such an organization is formed, it can set out for world revolution and enslavement of mankind. In this aggressive organization, the puppet Peiping regime holds a position far more important than all other Soviet satellites.

The total population of the Soviet satellites in Eastern

Europe is 100,000,000 and their armed forces 1,600,000, at most, while the population on the Chinese mainland is six times that number and the number of armed forces 5,000,-000. No matter whether the population figure announced by the Chinese Reds is correct and regardless of the quality of their army, to the Soviets at least, such a huge figure itself is something which cannot be overlooked.

To the Soviets, the Chinese Communist troops and the number of people which can be mobilized on the mainland are of great significance. It may either prove to be a force for them or one againat them. However, it is certain that they will place it under their strict and effective control.

Many students of the Far Eastern problems in the free world are inclined to believe that the huge army of the puppet Peiping regime is its great asset with which it can bargain with its Soviet master. Some of them even argue that because of it, the Chinese Communists will finally extricate themselves from the Soviet control.

In advancing such an argument, they have no doubt regarding both living and lifeless fighting potential as belonging to the same category. It is true that manpower can in time of war, either be turned into a labor force for the production of war materials or fighting force at the front. However, human being are after all different from lifeless things. They have a will of their own. In case of war, the oppressed people on the mainland may seize every available chance to form themselves into a counter force. In this respect, the Communists have had their experiences

in the anti-Communist revolts in Poland and Hungary.

However the problem we are discussing is confined to that of relationship among the Communist regimes, not an analysis of the psychological inclination of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain or the possibility of making use of the anti-Communist forces there to fight against our common enemy. This huge population, both Soviet Russia and the puppet regime in Peiping are well aware, can also become a force against them. Thus, they have to take adequate steps to forestall such an eventuality. Under such a circumstance, the formation of a military alliance is all the more urgent.

The first treaty of military alliance between them was the "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" signed on February 24, 1950 in Moscow. In its preamble, the two contracting parties declared that they are "fully determined to prevent jointly....the revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression."

Article I of the treaty makes clear in unequivocal terms its very nature: "Both contracting parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting

party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal."

In an agreement signed between them at the same time, it provides that Port Arthur is to be used by the Soviet troops unconditionally. This is, to all intents and purposes, an offensive alliance. To the Chinese Communists, it is a treaty betraying the interests of their country. In spite of that, on every anniversary of the signing of the treaty, the Chinese Communists as a rule shout about "long live the unbreakable alliance between China and Soviet Russia."

Such a treaty of alliance would be enough, as far as the military relations between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia are concerned. However, to step up military mobilization of all its satellites, Soviet Russia, since the outbreak of the Korean War, has dispatched a large batch of its military advisors to the Chinese mainland to undertake the task of military training in the Chinese Communist army, drawing up technical and fighting plans and military system. To facilitate military movements in future, it has reorganized the Chinese Communist army with respect to its equipment and all other details in such a way as to wholly fit in with the Soviet system.

At the same time, for the strengthening of the military transportation between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia, many strategic railroads hve been built. Soviet Russia has sent a large group of advisors and experts together with materials and equipment for their construction.

The two railroads that are of great economic and military importance are the Tsining Urga line which connects with the Turkish Railway, and the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma-Ata line which passes through Yu-men, Chi-chio-ching, Tihwa, Ching-ho, Po-lo, and A-la-shan in Russian territory and connects with the A-tou-chia station of the Turkish Railway. The former has been opened to traffic on New Year's Day of 1956. It uses the Russian gauge, much wider than those standard railways on the mainland. For the common construction of the latter, the puppet regime and Soviet Russia signed an agreement on October 12, 1954. This line has been built as far as Yu-men and according to schedule, the rails in Sinkiang will be laid next year.

These two railroads are not only used by the Soviets for the exploitation of natural resources on the mainland but also regarded as vitally important strategic railroads in any future war against the free world. Starting from the heartland of Soviet Russia, these two railroads stretch southward and eastward and connects with such important ports as Port Authur, Dairen, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Haichow, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, Amoy, Canton, Chankiang and others. They pose a serious threat to the free world and are designed to prepare for a war on two oceans. The puppet regime plays a vital role in this aggressive program. We should point out that Mao Tse-tung is more than anxious to play such a part. Even if he does not, he has to accept it, in view of the effective control which Soviet Russia has over its Chinese puppet.

The second military alliance was signed in Warsaw

on May 11, 1955. This is the so-called Warsaw Pact, having as its members Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Albania and East Germany. Though the puppet Peiping regime is not a member, it sent Peng Teh-huai to attend the conference as an observer.

Article I of this treaty declares: "In the event any one or more than one of the contracting parties is attacked, all other parties of the treaty should immediately give their support, including armed forces."

In the course of the Warsaw Conference, Bulganin said that Soviet Russia would give its all-out support to the invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese Communists. Peng Teh-huai also stated in the conference that "in case of the outbreak of war, we shall unite with all our brother nations to give the imperialists a fatal blow." Besides, he formally declared that the puppet regime in Peiping "will cooperate with all participating nations and give her all-out support to all decisions made in the Warsaw Conference." This statement is just a tacit admission that it is one of the members of the Warsaw Pact. This pact is not based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, like all others Soviet Russia has entered into with its satellites. But this one is especially so. According to it, with Soviet Russia as the center, all military forces behind the Iron Curtain are to be concentrated under the command of a Commander-in-Chief appointed by Soviet Russia. It is also provided that Soviet Russia, whenever necessary, can station its army in the member-states. As the puppet regime has given its support to the pact, of course it has to assume all duties imposed on its members. The fact that all submarine bases

and military airfields are under the control of the Soviets is a natural outcome.

With Soviet imperialist having all military secrets and controlling power of its army, is it not too much to expect that the puppet regime in Peiping is on a footing of equailty with its Soviet master?

Besides the two treaties mentioned above, there is another one which the puppet Peiping regime signed with East Germany, the so-called "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." It was signed on December 25, 1955. Chu Teh and Nieh Yung-chen went to East Germany to sign it. This treaty can be regarded as a supplement of the Warsaw Pact.

On the surface, it is a treaty of frienship and cooperation. In actuality, it is a military alliance. Article II of the treaty stipulates: "The two contracting parties shall see to it that their territories are not to be attached."

According to talks made by the Prime Minister of East Germany at the time, their position in the Soviet aggressive system is somewhat as follows:

First, the cooperation between the puppet regime in Peiping and East Germany is on the basis of coordination of the "600,000,000" population on the Chinese mainland and the potential arms production in East Germany. The original Soviet idea to bring about this cooperation is to make the population on the mainland cannon fodder and East Germany its arsenal in the "world revolution."

Secondly, at the present stage, offensive and defensive alliance will be the chief objective of the two puppet regimes with econonmic cooperation as a secondary objective. As stated in Articles II and VII of the treaty and just as what the Prime Minister of East Germany had said, the two puppet regimes face practically the same crisis. The growing influence of Free Germany throws East Germany in a state of constant nervousness. And the Chinese Communist design to invade Taiwan has to have the arms support from East Germany. These two puppets have another thing in common. Both of them are Soviet tools of aggression with no will and freedom of their own. With such a treaty, they can naturally serve their master better.

In short, the puppet regime is shackled by three military alliances in deference to the wishes of its Soviet master. Therefore, it cannot do anything against its master. All it can do is to do its best to carry out what it is told to do.

It should be recalled that, when the Nagy Government asked Soviet Russia to let it withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and to evacuate the Soviet troops from Hungarian territory, Khrushchev accused it of being "weak," charged all Hungarian patriots as being "counter-revolutionaries" and began a large-scale massacre. In so doing, he consciously or unconsciously committed the same mistake of "Czarism" with which he had once charged Stalin. In the face of this situation, the Chinese Communists had no other alternative but to call the "8th Session of the Central Committee" during which it gave its support to the armed intervention of Soviet Russia and justified the Russian action as being "right and proper." Following the publication of a statement by

Soviet Russia on October 30, the "People's Daily" of Peiping, in its editorial, made the following observation: "The Warsaw Pact is an important instrument in consolidating the Socialist camp."

In his reply to the question raised by a correspondent of the "Red Right Paper" of Czechoslovakia on December 30, 1956, Khrushchev said: "the most important task for the current year is how to improve and strengthen the collective military defense of the Communist bloc of nations." Thus, it is to be expected that the military relations between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia will be further strengthened. There is also reason to believe that Soviet Russia will again resort to armed suppression in its attempt to exercise effective control over all its satellites. Under such circumstances, even if the red puppet regime in Peiping had any intention to turn into Titoists, it would be a practical impossibility.

VII. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS CANNOT AND WILL NOT TURN INTO TITOISTS

The above analysis makes it abundantly clear that, judging from objective conditions, the Chinese Communists have no possibility of turning into Titoists. However, such an analysis and arguments advanced would not be sufficient to convince those who hold a contrary view. They would probably say: "the greater the pressure, the stronger the resistance." This is to say so strict is the control exercised over the Chinese Communists by the Soviets and so thoroughly the puppet Peiping regime is being exploited that a day will come, when it has no other alternative but to rise up and resist and head for Titoism.

All that we can say to these people is that the Chinese Reds cannot turn into Titoists both from objective and subjective viewpoints. Subjectively, they are not willing to do so. This is the real key to the problem. The following are our important argument for holding this view.

First, we should not forget that the Chinese Communists have grown and prospered under the influence of the Marxist-Leninist education. This long-term ideological inoculation has convinced them that capitalism will cerainly collapse; the victory of the world revolution by the proletrain class is absolute; and internationalism is a correct way to follow. For all these reasons, the lean-on-one-side policy

is necessary. This is to say, in the innermost recesses of their hearts, the Chinese Communists are persuaded that their own future and their long-term interests lie on the side of the Socialist camp in close cooperation with Soviet Russia. In the light of the actual world situation, it is true that, though the Communist camp has succeeded in expanding its influence following the end of World War II, it has many internal problems which defy solution. But, in the eyes of the Communists, the contradictions and crises facing the capitalist countries are even greater. Judging from the cold war strategy, the Communists believe that theirs is better than that of the free world. In short, the Communists are confident that, in the ensuing decisive battle, victory will belong to the Communist side, while "capitalism" is doomed to failure. Thus, subjectively, there is no reason to give up the side which will win and join the side which will fail. In other words, the Chinese Communists would not take the Titoist path in defiance of the Soviets to destroy their own future.

Secondly, it is true that the Chinese Communists are placed under strict control and exploited by the Soviets. On the other hand, they are compensated in other respects. First and foremost, they receive their material assistance from Soviet Russia. As mentioned above, they have to rely on Soviet Russia for all kinds of necessary aid. Leaving Soviet Russia, they would not be able to maintain the present industrial skeleton, no matter how unsound it may be. This is, however, by no means the most important. That they are willing to pledge their allegiance to their Soviet master is due to the unusual honor which the latter bestows upon them. At least on the surface, the puppet Peiping regime

plays the second fiddle in the Communist bloc of nations. The Chinese Reds also feel that so weak is their own strength that it would be utterly impossible for them to hold such high position in the Communist bloc of nations and to be so much respected in international affairs without Soviet backing. Under such circumstance, they cannot help feeling that by leaning on Soviet Russia, they have more to gain than to lose. In fact their present position is much higher than what they can expect to attain purely with their own efforts. Of course, they have good reasons to be satisfied with it. Particularly in Asia, both for historical and strategical reasons, the Soviets intentionally let their Chinese stooge play the leading role among the Communist parties in the East so as to facilitate their infitration in this vital area. This further whets the vanity of the puppet regime. Such being the case, it has every reason to feel grateful towards its Soviet master. Would it be willing to go so far as to destroy its future by taking the path of Titoism? So far as Mao Tse-tung is concerned, he may be willing to be Stalin the Second but would not so humiliate himself as to be Tito the Second. Furthermore, the puppet regime in Peiping now holds a position among the Communist nations only next to that of Soviet Russia. It may be appropriately asked: If it joined the free world, could it hold such a position of leadership? Such being the case, how could it be expected to turn into a Titoist?

Thirdy, while fully conscious of its own position and influence in the Communist camp, the puppet regime is not ignorant of unrest and insecurity within it. In the face of this situation, it has no other alternative but to make the following decision: to do its best to stabilize and con-

solidate the unity of the Communist nations. Any weakening or disintegration of the Communist bloc, the Chinese Communists are aware, would inevitably affect their position either directly or indirectly just as its continued growth would benefit them. They definitely believe that if they could contribute their share to the solidarity of the Communist bloc at the time when it faces difficulties, they would find favor in the sight of their Soviet master, thus further raising their own position. This is the fundamental policy of the puppet Peiping regime. It is also the main reason why it would not turn into a Titoist. Should it follow a Titoist line, it would inevitably bring about the disintegration of the Communist bloc. Of course, such a thing it would not do now. Viewing from this perspective, we can easily understand what the Chinese Reds are doing today. They exhort consolidation among the Communist bloc of nations led by Soviet Russia. Their attempt to persuade Gomulka and their opposition to the Nagy line in Hungary were prompted by the same desire.

Fourthly, it should be pointed out that it is not easy for a Communist country to adopt the Titoist line. It is indeed a kind of great spiritual burden. First of all, it will be accused, for so doing of being a "Communist rebel," "Marxist reformist," "violator of internationalism" and "collaborator of the western capitalists." All these are most serious charges in the eyes of an orthodox Communist, who would never attempt to do so, unless absolutely necessary. Let us take Tito's case for example. That he finally defected from the Kremlin was not out of his own free will. Nor did he take the initiative. His expulsion from the politburo by Stalin was the main cause. If Stalin did not take such a

violent step, Tito, we are sure, would think twice before he took such a step. Even after he has left the Communist bloc, he never for a single moment neglects the interests of the Communist bloc of nations. Facts show that he invariably gives his support to Soviet Russia. So close is the spiritual tie among the Communists that it can never be broken. On the other hand, with the lesson of Yugoslavia still fresh in its mind Soviet Russia is careful not to commit the same mistake again. After the death of Stalin, his heirs, Malenkov and Khrushchev, have changed radically their attitude and strategy with the Soviet satellites. They have tried hard to bring Yugoslavia back to the fold. Thus we can say with certainty that the new Kremlin rulers would never again run the same kind of risk in their dealings with the puppet Peiping regime as what Stalin had done to Yugoslavia. Under such circumstance, it is quite unthinkable that the puppet regime in Peiping would ever follow the Titoist line.

We are inclined to beleive that these psychological factors, namely, their faith in the ultimate victory of world Communism, their satisfaction with the present important position they have among the Communist nations, their conviction that they have the responsibility to protect the Communist bloc, and their endeavor to avoid any fresh ideological and internal confusion within the Communist camp as Titoism has done—are potent enough to dissuade the Chinese Communists to turn into a Titoist. Thus, for its own interests, the puppet regime in Peiping has no subjective reasons to follow what Tito has done. Both subjective and objective conditions being such, it would be fantastic to assume that the puppet regime in Peiping would become a Titoist.

VIII. A NEW TREND IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEIPING

In the course of Chou En-lai's recent pilgrimage to Soviet Russia and his tour of Eastern Europe, a new trend in the relations between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia has unfolded. While the Soviet imperialists have shown increased confidence in and dependence on their No. One satellite—the Puppet Peiping regime—in view of the utility of the latter, the position of the Chinese Communists has obviously been raised in the eyes of their Soviet master and other Soviet satellites, and their words carry greater weight than ever before. This trend, though visible sometime ago, is more obvious now. This trend is now being expressed in a new form. The publication of the joint communique by the puppet regime and Soviet Russia and the contents therein are a reflection of this trend.

There is nothing strange about this new trend. Nothing is more natural than for a master to listen to what his loyal and trusted servent has to say now and then. Particularly at a time when the master is in trouble, he naturally will fall back more and more on the services of his trusted servant. In fact, judged from the series of crises in Soviet Russia after the death of Stalin, especially the anti-Communist revolts in Poland, Hungary and other satellites in Eastern Europe, it is inevitable that Soviet Russia would depend more on the services of its trusted Chinese stooge.

We can predict that under such circumstances it will lavish more favors on the puppet Peiping regime, as already displayed in many instances.

In face of such a situation, some people draw the following conclusion: The puppet regime has raised its position to that of "independence" and "autonomy" in its relations with Soviet Russia. To this we cannot agree. There are others who think that the change of relationship between the puppet regime and Soviet Russia will have the way for the introduction of Titoism. Such a line of thought is absurd. The characteristic of Titoism, it should be pointed out, is not only to strive for independence and autonomy by a Soviet satellite from Soviet Russia but also to dissociate itself completely from the Communist bloc nations. The line now being followed by the puppet Peiping regime is to give greater support to Soviet Russia and to consolidate and stabilize the Communist family of nations. In recognition of its services, it might be possible that Soviet Russia would give it greater "independence" and "autonomy." This would only be an adjustment within the Communist bloc and therefore, have nothing to do with Titoism. Furthermore, the greater favor Soviet Russia shows to its Chinese stooge, the more devotion the latter would serve to its interests, and lean on its master. Under these circumstances, it would lose any interest for Ttoism.

In fact, the puppet regime would never become a Titoist on its own volition. On the contrary, it would serve as Soviet vanguard against Titoism. The visit paid by Chou En-lai to Poland, and Hungary was aimed at overcoming the Titoist tendency of these nations. He stressed "streng-

thening of solidarity among the Socialist countries led by Soviet Russia," wherever he went. This is actually the political line of the puppet regime to which it will undoubtedly follow in the days to come.

There is one more point which we should like to point out. If Khrushchev's purge of Stalin in 1955 were his endeavor to win Yugoslavia back to the fold, then Chou En-lai's recent trip to Moscow would be an obvious attempt to revive Stalinism. If so, Khrushchev's praise of Stalin in the course of the dinner at the Embassy of the puppet Peiping regime in Moscow was an intentional gesture to curry the favor of the Chinese Communists. The cautious reaction of the puppet Peiping regime towards the de-Stalinization Movement in the past is an indication that Mao Tse-tung is by nature more Stalinist than Khrushchev. Now that his words carry more weight with his Kremlin master, he has the chance to avenge Stalin.

From this we can safely conclude that if the Chinese Communists can exercise any influence over Soviet Russia, such an influence is not a good one. The more favor their Soviet master shows them, the greater harm they will do. In other words, with more "independence" and "autonomy" given to them by the Kremlin, their threat to the free world will be greater. In the face of the new trend in the relations between the puppet Peiping regime and Soviet Russia, the free world would do well to plan how to deal with such a new development. It would be a fatal mistake to think that the puppet Peiping regime would turn into a Titoist. It has to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists are doing their utmost to overcome the difficulties of their master so as to

consolidate the Communist bloc. Under such circumstances, all the free nations in drawing up their anti-Communist strategy should decide at an early date how they can deal a greater blow to the puppet regime in Peiping.

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